

## **Europeanizing Industrial Heritage in Europe: Addressing its Transboundary and Dark Sides**

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### **Zur Europäisierung von Industriekultur in Europa: Die Ansprache ihrer grenzüberschreitenden und dunklen Seiten**

The protection of selected industrial heritage sites is a matter of course in most European countries, and projects such as the European Route of Industrial Heritage (ERIH) seem to indicate that transnational approaches are increasingly popular. However, a closer look at selection strategies, patterns of justification and interpretative approaches reveals typical deficits: Firstly, the material and immaterial transnational linkages and interconnections typical of the industrialisation process are only inadequately communicated, even in projects supported by European funding. Secondly, the dark sides of European industrialisation processes and phases are only rarely appropriately represented, so that the world reflected in industrial cultural projects to date can only be described as sanitized industrial heritage. Thirdly, there are practically no attempts to select objects or sites that are specifically European in character – instead, objects/sites are designated as European simply because they are located there. The following contribution attempts to identify ways in which the Europeanness of industrial heritage can be more clearly defined and strategies developed to overcome the deficits mentioned above.

#### *1 Introduction*

Industrial heritage protection is now a well established, although marginal, field of cultural heritage politics in many European countries. Sites such as Ironbridge Gorge (U.K.), Engelsbergs bruk ironworks (Sweden) or Zollverein coal mine (Germany) have become familiar icons of past industrial ages, not only in select specialist circles but also for a broader international general public. While the early initiatives in this field were markedly national in their thrust, the recently substantially enlarged European Route of Industrial Heritage (ERIH), whose sponsors include the European Cohesion Fund (Interreg IVB), seems to offer a fascinating European approach that transcends national boundaries. ERIH is not an initiative of the monuments

authorities of the countries involved. However, it is the most consistent industrial heritage/industrial tourism strategy to date at a European level and can serve as an introductory paradigm, with regard to both its assets and its deficiencies. ERIH now links 72 so-called Anchor Points in 32 European countries, which serve as starting points for numerous themed routes, amounting to a total of more than 800 sites (see <http://www.erih.net/index.php>).

However, a closer look at (1) the current inventory of industrial heritage sites in Europe, (2) the underlying selection criteria and (3) dominant interpretative strategies reveals characteristic deficits. Important narratives related to current valorizations can be summarized as follows:

- Traditional industrial heritage valorizations almost exclusively display and represent individual objects, sites and events linked to national territories, histories and identities. The world of transnational linkages, which are so characteristic of most industries of the secondary sector and the resources they rely on, is almost totally excluded.
- Impressive narratives about creative entrepreneurs, innovative corporations, inventive engineers and visionary architects abound, all of them mostly active in times of peace and progress. If darker sides of the industrialisation process are addressed at all, the focus is on social or environmental aspects. It is much rarer that industrial heritage valorisations and their interpretation appropriately reflect disquieting realities of war and occupation or the ordeals of prisoners of war and forced labour<sup>1</sup>.
- While it can be claimed without any exaggeration that Europe's stock of industrial heritage is rich, hardly any site of the ERIH endeavour has been selected because of European specificity (however defined, nor are existing sites consistently interpreted from this specific perspective, a deficit that is typical of almost any other industrial heritage site in Europe (and including the renowned Route of Industrial Heritage in the German Ruhr industrial area).

Taking as its starting point these blind-spots in our traditional representation of industrialisation and industry as well as the resulting narratives, this paper is an appeal to explore complementary approaches more systematically. This should enable us to more appropriately (re)construct historic industrial facts and to address some of those facets that to date are not taken into account, that are invisible, concealed, forgotten, repressed or erased. The current focus on technology and architecture, in particular that is so characteristic of most industrial heritage valorisations worldwide, does not need to be replaced but complemented. The paper seeks to identify alternative ways of thinking about and representing industry in the heritage field, ways that do not exclude the transboundary and the dark sides

of the industrial use of resources, industrialisation processes and locational decision-making. In doing this, the current paper is embedded in a recent strand of (Historical... Landscape... Heritage...) Geography to re-adjust some of the discipline's traditional perspectives to strongly pluralized, fragmented and contested realities and ways of remembering – as well as academic approaches that try to deal with these new worlds (e.g. Ashworth/Graham/Tunbridge 2007, *Orte der Erinnerung* 2009).

In the following, however, the scope is limited to a very specific issue of our industrialized pasts, i.e. military industrial complexes (MICs, cf. Pursell 1972) created during both peace- and war-time (as well as war-induced complexes) of the last decades of the 19<sup>th</sup> century as well as WW I and WW II, a development that is typical for Europe. The same ideas, however, can also be applied to East Asian theatres of war, in particular during the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Soyez/Li 2009).

This paper's line of argument is as follows: After this brief introduction (1), two illustrative examples will be presented, firstly Peenemünde, the Third Reich's infamous site for missile development and testing, now a Historical Technical Information Centre and integrated into the above-mentioned ERIH scheme, and secondly Völklingen Ironworks, which has been one of Germany's three industrial sites in the UNESCO World Cultural Heritage scheme since 1994 (as well as being an ERIH site). These case studies will be used to clarify the issues at stake and significant aspects, followed by a brief interim conclusion (2). In the main section, tentative conceptual perspectives will be outlined, hopefully enabling us to better address existing deficiencies in industrial heritage valorisations (3). In a short conclusion the main suggestions will be wrapped up (4).

## *2 Clarifying the Issues at Stake*

### 2.1 Peenemünde

In early 1992, a variety of renowned German institutions (both industrial and public interest

R&D associations, such as DLR (German Aerospace Center) and governmental representatives prepared to celebrate an important anniversary in the development of space technology: The 1942 launch, at Peenemünde on the north-east German Baltic coast, of the first missile to reach space (or more precisely an altitude of about 85 km) and with a horizontal range of 190 km (for more detailed information cf. Bode/Kaiser 2004). Immediately prior to the planned event, however, international protest and pressure had become so strong that the event had to be cancelled (New York Times, Sept. 29, 1992). Apparently, the German organizers had completely underestimated the sensitivities that both this site and this missile touched upon outside Germany: Peenemünde was the (Army and Air Force) Military Test Site for the development, construction and testing of the A4 rocket, later known as the V2 (Vengeance weapon No. 2) in typical propaganda jargon. This missile was mainly used in 1944/1945 to attack London and later also Antwerp and other cities from sites in the Netherlands and France during the last months of WW II. It claimed the lives of thousands of civilians and, because of its lack of precision, brought random terror and havoc to many parts of the targeted city centres and their suburbs. Although the planned celebration at Peenemünde clearly should be seen in the context of what Ashworth/Hartmann (2005, 259-60) call apologetic stances, far removed from the usual strategies typical of perpetrators, i.e. denial, concealment or blame shift, this did not soothe the feelings of the victims and their descendants.

While nobody denied the importance of this missile for the subsequent development of space technology, the site and its historic legacy quite naturally evoked a variety of evil associations, not only in England and Belgium, but particularly also in Eastern Europe (and beyond, see below).

Originally, Peenemünde was mostly a site for R&D and testing, and only ca. 200 A4 rockets were actually produced here (Bode/Kaiser 2004, 98). On 17<sup>th</sup>/18<sup>th</sup> August 1943, however,

an intense bomb attack by British forces had made it clear that such an exposed site within reach of the Allied air forces had become too risky to be fully developed into a production site. Within only a few months the A4 world was transformed into a spatially scattered industrial production system with an ultimate output of almost 6,000 rockets by the end of the war (Bode/Kaiser 2004, 98). This system had the following functional differentiation: (1) R&D in Peenemünde, (2) testing in occupied Poland in wide swathes starting at Blizna east of Cracow and Tuchola north of Bydgoszcz (and with uncontrolled impacts east of Warsaw and west of Lodz), and (3) serial production in a rapidly enlarged underground site, a former anhydrite mine at Kohnstein Quarry on the southern slopes of the Harz Mountains, close to the small town of Nordhausen/Thuringia. It should be emphasized, however, that “production” here mainly meant “assembly”, as the rocket’s parts were produced by some 450 lead contractors with presumably thousands of subcontractors located all over Germany and in a number of occupied European countries (Wagner 2004, 201ff.).

On this Kohnstein site a new branch concentration camp (Aussenlager), called Dora (later to become the concentration camp Mittelbau), was established (for a comprehensive overview and evaluation cf. Wagner 2004). It was soon overcrowded with thousands of POWs and forced labour arriving from other camps, mainly from Buchenwald, but later also from Mauthausen and others, including Auschwitz. At the end of WW II the complex Mittelbau-Dora and the production site proper, Mittelwerk, housed more than 40,000 camp inmates and forced labourers as well as around 5,000 German military, engineers and specialists of all kinds (for details cf. Bode/Kaiser 2004). All prisoners had to live and work (on both construction and production sites) in extremely de-humanised conditions, leading to the death of around 20,000 people (Wagner 2004, 287). Even if it cannot be proven that one of the most prominent pioneers of the space age and one of the fathers of the American moon program, Dr. Wernher von Braun, was personally

involved in this context, it is difficult to believe that he was unaware of these darkest aspects of the German missile project.

Thus, Peenemünde, Dora-Mittelbau and Mittelwerk, together with their innumerable industrial subcontractors all over Germany and in some of the then occupied countries, must be regarded as a war-induced, transnational military-industrial complex (MIC), especially so because the Kohnstein underground site had also become a production/assembly site for the Fieseler Fi 103 flying-bomb (V1) and Junkers Flugzeug- und Motorenwerke jet engine production during the last two years of the war (Wagner 2004, 2011ff).

Recently, the Peenemünde site was accepted as an Anchor Point of ERIH, the European Route of Industrial Heritage. The site was allegedly chosen because of its importance for the development of a specific technology, but not explicitly in order to document the dark sides of this location and its spatial reach.

## 2.2 Völklingen Ironworks

Another case in point is the Völklingen iron and steel mill, founded in 1871 and operated by the entrepreneurial Röchling family since 1883. While the steel mill is still operational as the main facility of SAARSTAHL AG, the ironworks and its auxiliary plants (e.g. coke plant, sintering plant etc.) were shut down in 1986. The site was awarded World Cultural Heritage status in 1994. It is located only a few kilometres from the German-French border, i.e. in a region that has been characterized by several international border shifts and mutual attempts of annexation by both countries since the late 18<sup>th</sup> century. Furthermore, it is a typical example of a plant that developed into an important military-industrial complex (MIC) during long periods of its existence, due to specific spatio-temporal contexts (cf. Hudemann et al. 2002).

The late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries are of particular interest here: Following the Treaty of Frankfurt in 1871, the newly founded Ger-

man Empire proceeded with the annexation of some of the easternmost départements in the greater Alsace-Lorraine region of France. Alsace-Lorraine, together with adjacent parts of today's northern France, Belgium, Luxemburg and Saarland, is one of Europe's most important industrial cores. As early as in the late 18<sup>th</sup> and early 19<sup>th</sup> century, this region was characterised by a complex pattern of early industrial interrelations. It linked resources, mines, manufactories, and later factories, banks, trading companies and customers in an intricate web of transnational interdependencies. The ancestors of influential late 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century entrepreneurial families, such as de Wendel and Röchling, were already solidly embedded in this boundary-transcending industrial setting. The new 1871 international border between France and Germany cut this system in two and created new and often very painful realities – as did the loss of the annexed areas for both Saar and Ruhr corporations after WW I more than 50 years later. While it is apparent today that the exact delineation of the new French-German border in 1871 was mainly due to reasons of military strategy and not economic ones, it led to a comprehensive remapping of property rights and access to the huge iron ore deposits now predominantly located in the new German Empire's westernmost territories. This iron ore, with a high phosphorous content and referred to locally as minette, had been known for decades, although the exact extent of the deposits had not yet been mapped in detail. It had been processed and traded by the above-mentioned de Wendel and Röchling families, among others. However, these families' regional industrial empires could only flower after the introduction of the Thomas-Gilchrist steel-making process, widely implemented in the Lorraine-Saar region during the late 1880s and early 1890s (for details as to resource use, technical development and so forth cf. Herrmann 2004, Quasten 2004).

Völklingen ironworks was originally founded in 1871 but shut down a few years later due to low profitability. It was then taken over and successfully redeveloped by the entrepreneur Carl Röchling in 1883. In 1891 a Thomas steel mill

started production in Völklingen using minette iron ore from the company's own mines in annexed Lorraine. From 1897 pig iron from the company's new Carlshütte blast furnaces complex in what was then Diedenhofen (in French: Thionville) was also used. By the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century a characteristic production system had been established. In an almost colonial manner it now linked not only the Saar (Röchling/Völklingen, von Stumm/Neunkirchen), but also important Ruhr corporations (such as Thyssen, Klöckner, Mannesmann and Krupp) with the minette resource base: On-site pig iron production took place in German-owned ironworks in Lorraine, followed by high value subsequent processing, including armaments production, in the steel and finishing mills of the larger Saar and Ruhr industrial regions. Only in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, just before WW I, did some German industrialists start to establish integrated iron and steel production facilities in Lorraine, such as Thyssen (Thyssen iron and steel plant in what was then Hagondange, now Hagondange).

The subsequent history of the territorial shifts of the Lorraine, Saar and Luxemburg region as well as the individual fate of Völklingen iron and steel mill from 1919 until the early 1980s are too complex to be presented here in detail (for an account of the complex pattern of linkages, territorial shifts and migration patterns cf. Hudemann et al. 2002). Suffice it to say that access to ore and coal resources as well as the property rights over the industrial stock in both Lorraine and the Saar region shifted several times, creating a seemingly uninterrupted, constantly boundary-transcending sequence of (mostly) painful events and impacts for all sides involved and all over the larger region. Of particular importance, however, is the role of the Völklingen entrepreneur and political activist Hermann Röchling during the Third Reich. Hermann Röchling was a son of Carl Röchling, mentioned earlier, from whom he took over the Völklingen mills in 1898. He never accepted the loss of the Lorraine facilities after WW I but was successful in staving off a French take-over of the Völklingen ironworks. He subsequently became one of the most revi-

sionist actors in influential industrial and political circles of Nazi Germany (cf. Mollin 1988, Tooze 2006). This is testified to in particular by the high positions he occupied before and during WW II. As early as 1935 he became a member of the Reich's Armament Advisory Board (Rüstungsbeirat) and (particularly important in this context) after the occupation of France in 1940 he was appointed the Reich's Plenipotentiary Representative for the Iron and Steel Industry in occupied Lorraine, Meurthe-et-Moselle and Longwy (for details of his political activities there, especially with regard to his personal economic interests and including the dismantling of competitors' industrial facilities in Lorraine and the Benelux states in the early 1940s, cf. Mollin 1988, 220ff., Banken 2004, 3, Tooze 2006). He also was active in acquiring larger forced labour contingents for the Völklingen site (while at the same time being almost a model patron for his German workers and their families by establishing all kinds of social and other privileges, Krebs 2002, 4). Hermann Röchling was also the author of several memoranda to Hitler himself, including one dating from August 1936 and calling for war against the Soviet Union (Bundesarchiv R 43-II/208).

Finally, bearing in mind this site's transnational implications over time, it should be mentioned that the Völklingen steel mill was taken over by the Luxembourg ARBED in 1978 (itself a product of late 19<sup>th</sup> century mergers and capital interests from Luxembourg, Belgium and the Saar region), which in turn later merged with Spanish Aceralia and French Usinor to form Arcelor, only to be taken over by Indian Mittal in 2006, which is now the world's largest steel company and has been re-named Arcelor Mittal. Since 2001, SAARSTAHL AG together with Dillinger Hütte (Saarlouis) has formally been part of Montan-Stiftung-Saar and its 100% subsidiary SHS Struktur-Holding-Saar, a holding in which Arcelor has more than 30% of the shares through Dillinger Hütte (cf. official press release of Dillinger Hütte/Montan-Stiftung-Saar 2008).

## 2.3 Interim Conclusion (I)

Both the Peenemünde and the Völklingen case study provide useful information and insights that corroborate our critical introductory remarks: They represent important industrial sites as well as complex production systems with innumerable transnational implications, although with very different life spans; they have been awarded a high profile status in the industrial heritage field by independent international observers; and the main reasons for their distinction are particularly spectacular, or innovative, technological achievements in their respective domains, while their uniqueness has awarded them a clearly acknowledged legitimization: Peenemünde is the undisputed hearth of space technology while Völklingen is the only remaining and almost complete witness to early 20<sup>th</sup> century iron production technology in Europe. However:

(1) While some of their darker implications are not at all concealed on websites or during guided tours, they are not consistently displayed, interpreted and contextualized.

At the Peenemünde site proper, the Historical Technical Museum, the shocking contrast between the impressive engineering feat on the one side, and the cruel exploitation of slave labour on the other, is appropriately dealt with. Furthermore, a serious deficiency has been addressed recently with the new emphasis on Peenemünde's constitutive links with Mittelbau-Dora and Mittelwerk (although a link from the Mittelbau-Dora Concentration Camp Memorial to the Peenemünde site is non-existent, as is adequate information about these crucial linkages on the ERIH site). For any uninformed visitor, however, it is still impossible to fathom the former reality of this murderous industrial production system, its size, its boundary-transcending spatial ramifications or its inner functional workings. In other words: Peenemünde is not adequately represented as a crucial element in one of the most important European MICs during WW II.

At the Völklingen Ironworks World Cultural Heritage site, the highly problematic involvement of two generations of Röchling entrepreneurs during both the Wilhelminian era and the Third Reich is not addressed in a way that elucidates the historical depths, the spatial reach and functions of this facility, nor is the significance of the Völklingen site as the constitutive node of an important MIC over almost exactly one century explicated in any way.

(2) These two sites' extreme transnational character, interdependences and impacts are not addressed systematically, neither with regard to their political and economic facets nor concerning their darkest sides, the forced labour imposed on citizens from practically all countries occupied by the Reich (including the foreign "volunteers" guarding the labour slaves).

And finally, (3) a particularly intriguing issue in the current context: there is no reference at all to these sites' potentials to represent any kind of European specificity (or trans-European specificity, for that matter, beyond its technologies), and to be – or become – constitutive for any kind of specific Europeanness.

Peenemünde and Völklingen represent two very individual cases. But from a higher vantage point it becomes clear that they can serve as paradigms: If we conceptualize Europe's industrial landscapes as palimpsest, we only have to scratch the surface to discover a multi-layered industrial history, marked by pervasive processes that transcend former and current national boundaries, be it through ideas, patents, capital, or hardware – and transferred or imposed both by travelling engineers, invading armies and forced labour shuffled back and forth according to the inner logics of war-time machineries. More often than not, sites evoking dark memories and (potentially) contested heritage can be traced, offering illustrative examples of intrinsic dissonances, i.e. a "discordance or lack of agreement and consistency as to the meaning of heritage" (Graham et al. 2000, 24, cf. also Tunbridge/Ashworth 1996), as well as more or less deliberate politics of history. Such examples

are, however, subject in all European countries to very selective strategies of representation (on this characteristic of many industrial heritage sites cf. Li/Soyez 2006). In order to make these different layers as well as their dissonances more accessible and understandable, not only for specialised experts but also for a general tourist public – and bearing in mind specific educational goals for future generations –, more carefully designed strategies of representation and interpretation of industrial heritage sites are necessary.

In order to identify alternative ways of dealing with these deficits, appropriate conceptualizations need to be explored for the three sets of issues addressed so far: transboundary issues, dark heritage, European heritage.

### *3 Terminological and Conceptual Discussion*

#### 3.1 Transboundary Issues

Approaches that transcend "(spatial) container thinking" are common in recent geographical conceptualisations, notably in the treatment of industries and industrialisation (as mirrored, for example, in influential textbooks such as *Global Shift*, Dicken 1986, and more recently *Economic Geography*, Coe et al. 2007). While in many respects this is a mere extension of traditional geographical thinking in terms of functional interlinkages (both domestic and international), the case studies outlined above demonstrate that a purely functional perspective is too narrow. In particular, the well-documented actions and strategies of individual entrepreneurs, corporations, politicians and military clearly show the close interaction with – and the pervasive influences exerted by – a complex set of political, economic, financial, military, social, ideological and individual spheres transcending national boundaries. Evidently, the actors – individuals, corporations or states – in any given industrial-historic context are ensnared in an intricate web of opportunities and constraints. These implications reach far beyond what is traditionally

addressed in mainstream Industrial Geography. Aspects such as greed, reputation, personal idiosyncrasies, power and nationalistic ideologies, as well as just riding the tide or avoiding political risks in authoritarian settings, are intimately interwoven with transboundary processes, whether with regard to locational decision-making or the inner workings of production processes. This is particularly true in times of war and occupation. Most of these aspects are rarely addressed consistently, neither in mainstream Industrial Geography, nor in industrial heritage strategies. Thus, if these facets of reality are to be integrated in (industrial) heritage approaches, a broader perspective on transnational issues is essential.

A complementary view is offered by the concept of transnationalism (thoroughly discussed by Pries 2008, Smith 2001). In the international literature it is also understood to comprise pluri- and translocal social, political, cultural or economic interactions that transcend international boundaries. In contrast to many concepts of globalization, including the field of economic transactions where the focus is often on disembodied processes, the transnationalism approach makes it possible to address transboundary flows of systems of symbols and meanings more consistently, as well as boundary-crossing in every-day social practices, trans-local identities, hybridities or discourse-spaces that are still firmly anchored in national states.

Intimately linked with these approaches are recent theoretical approaches in the discipline of history, which can be broadly categorized as relational Transnational History Concepts (Becker 2004, Budde et al. 2005, Kaelble 2005, Werner/Zimmermann 2004, 2006). Different facets and foci in this rapidly growing body of literature bear different names, such as transfer history, transnational history, connected history, shared history, *histoire croisée*/crossed history or entangled history<sup>2</sup>. Their common thrust, however, is to go beyond traditional national and comparative perspectives in order to deal more effectively with the evident and pervasive processes of plurilateral mutual interpenetration, interdependences, transfers and ensuing

intersections – between neighbouring countries, between continents, between centres and peripheries as well as with regard to actors, institutions, corporations, different sectors of society, culture and so on.

In the current geographical context, potential applications of the entanglement concept have a strong appeal: no other term seems to hold a comparable metaphorical power to literally visualize the knottings and weavings of innumerable threads of action and influence in a transnational setting. Better than any other of the above mentioned terms, it makes clear how transnationally active actors, whether individuals, organisations, institutions or states, are inextricably and inevitably linked to and mutually dependent on each other, linking not only direct neighbours but even also countries, societies and actors in different parts of the globe. Frevert (2005) has furthermore underlined the fact that these processes and impacts of mutual influence, transmission, imposition, adoption, absorption and hybridisation are pervasive not only in times of peace, but also – and maybe even more so – in times of war or occupation.

In the discipline of Geography the term entanglement is far from unknown. It has mainly been used descriptively and metaphorically for decades (e.g. Heske 1991 or Cumbers 2008). In some cases conceptual aims are also formulated, e.g. when Sharp et al. (2000, 24) establish a direct connection with actor-network theory (ANT) in the context of entanglements of power. The transfer of the main thrust – and specific facets – of the entanglement approach to industrial (heritage) geography issues seems to be both feasible and appropriate: By adopting a conceptually informed perspective of entangled industrial (heritage) geography on the cases of Peenemünde and Völklingen, crucial aspects of their evolution can be addressed more easily, although with a special focus on spatial rather than temporal implications. Further specific case studies would be necessary in order to resolve critical questions concerning the general benefit and applicability of the approach for industrial geography or for different variants of transnational Geographies of Heritage.

## 3.2 Dark Heritage

In everyday language reference is frequently made to the “dark” sides of an event or a development, implicitly assumed with regard to historical heritage as there is no clear definition of “dark heritage”. Thus Graham et al. (2000, 19) refer to this concept without any further explanation: “Inevitably [...] the past as rendered through heritage also promotes the burdens of history, the atrocities, errors and crimes [...]”. As these very dark sides – and the places that symbolise them – are increasingly becoming destinations for a growing dark tourism (atrocities tourism, grief tourism...), there have been some attempts to define the specific nature of this phenomenon more exactly (for a more detailed account see for example Ashworth/Hartmann 2005, Lennon/Foley 2006). Thus, Lennon/Foley’s (2006, 11-12) argument is “that ‘dark tourism’ is an intimation of post-modernity”, where (1) “global communication technologies play a major part in creating the initial interest”, (2) “the objects of dark tourism themselves appear to introduce anxiety and doubt about the project of modernity” and (3) “the educative elements of sites are accompanied by elements of commodification and a commercial ethic which [...] accepts that visitation [...] is an opportunity to develop a tourism product”. Furthermore, they add a very restrictive condition, namely that the dark events must have taken place “within the memories of those still alive to validate them” (ibid., 12).

While all these criteria apply, to a large degree, to a site with the dramatic implications of Peenemünde, I would argue that a broadening of our understanding of the term is both appropriate and necessary for the majority of industrial heritage sites (and perhaps also in other fields). Firstly, there are events and phases in the history of nations and groups that remain painful even after hundreds of years and thus qualify for the designation as being “dark” for at least one party involved. Very typical in this respect are battles and battle sites that play a decisive role in the collective memory of nations, such as Amsfeld, Waterloo or Sedan, even if it has

to be admitted that the ways of remembering such events far back in history are different from the ways of remembering events lived through. Secondly, there are many sites (events, processes or periods etc.) in history that reveal darker sides of life without being characterised by cruelties and atrocities. All of them attract both victims and perpetrators of these historic events – and later also their descendants.

Therefore I would suggest the use of the qualification of “dark”, for example in terms such as dark heritage, dark tourism and so on, also in all those cases where the specificity of a site, an object or a destination is characterised by the fact that at least one party affected has a strong feeling of pain and injustice, due for instance to violence, the use of force, oppression or humiliation. All this applies to sites like Peenemünde and Völklingen – and a host of other examples testifying to industrialization processes all over Europe.

### 3.3 European Heritage

There is a remarkably broad range of opinions – and just as many conflicts – as to what exactly ‘Europe’ is or could be (for some recent geographical perspectives cf. Heffernan 1998, Paasi 2000, MacNeill 2004). As a result there is also no single definition of “European cultural heritage”, i.e. of cultural heritage that is specifically “European” and not just located in Europe (cf. the discussion in this theme issue’s introduction). These questions have long been discussed by geographers interested in heritage issues (e.g. Ashworth/Larkham 1994, Tunbridge 1994, 1998, Ashworth/Graham 1997, Graham 1998, Graham et al. 2000, Peckham 2003), in particular with regard to (and possibly sparked off by) the “lack of Europeanness in the identity profiles of Europeans” (Graham/Hart 1999) which is bemoaned in many European countries. These publications all break with the tradition of earlier debates insofar as, firstly, they do not regard the diversity of cultural achievements as an impediment but instead as a highly valuable structural

element of Europeanness, and secondly, because they consistently attempt to include the dark sides of European history. Ashworth/Graham (1997, 382) suggest that this could be achieved by adding “new layers of meaning to built-environments and landscapes that are already fundamental symbols within national regional iconographies and narratives” (for more specific details see Graham et al. 2000, 224ff.).

Thus the central idea is therefore to use the typically European contradiction between numerous examples of successful, if temporary, integration on the one hand and the dominant (in quantitative terms) heritage of horrors on the other hand as a leitmotif for what is specifically European, the most significant aim of this approach being to make a reprise of the darkest phases of European history impossible.

Based on these considerations and with explicit reference to the ideas of Frevert (2005), Soyeux (2006) has suggested that connectivity and conflict, which at a first glance appear contradictory but are nevertheless interrelated, could be made central criteria for the selection and interpretation of specifically European industrial heritage. However, unlike the quote from Ashworth/Graham (1997) used above, this is not merely with the intention of adding a further layer of meaning to existing symbols of national iconographies. While this should be an important strategy that can help to systematically identify the wide European connections of numerous existing sites, for example along the European Route of Industrial Heritage (ERIH) including Peenemünde and Völklingen, it is even more important to select and develop previously ignored sites of industrial production systems in Europe on the basis of their specifically European past in terms of connectivity and conflict.

Using a different perspective, the historian François (who also has a geographical background) has developed further important categories for the characterisation of sites of European historical cultural heritage (and thus potentially for their selection). These categories can also be applied to the area of industrial heritage discussed here.

Based on work by Nora (1984), François started by further developing the conceptualisation of so-called lieux de mémoire, applying this research to Germany (François/Schulze 2001). Lieux de mémoire are understood as particular crystallisation points of collective memory and identity. More often than not, the term “site” is used here in a metaphorical sense and is thus often distanced from concrete geographical locations. From a perspective of industrial (heritage) geography, this approach is particularly interesting as it is not restricted to tangibles, such as blast furnaces, but also comprises a potentially huge variety of intangibles, such as historic events, certain types of literature or just influential ideas, such as the project of Europe – most of which can still be linked to “sites” in a geographical sense. Furthermore, the idea of change, i.e. the opposite of any kind of “fossilisation”, is integrated in the concept of lieux de mémoire, as testified to by François/Schulze (2001, 18, translated from German): “[a lieu de mémoire is] characterised by a surplus of symbolic and emotional dimensions, embedded in societal, cultural and political ways of thinking and doing as well as changing to the extent, in which ways of their perception, adoption, use and transfer are changing”. The classification later suggested by François (2006, 301-302) in the context of potential European lieux de mémoire is particularly helpful in the kind of industrial heritage contexts evoked above. He distinguishes between the following sites of memory (translated from German):

- shared (shared, widely accepted meanings even in a transnational context),
- split (conceptualised as crossroads or overlaps between nations, but characterised by divergent or completely different narratives), and
- indirect or implicit lieux de mémoire (where their role as clearly national sites of remembrance is not questioned, but they also have many transboundary linkages).

There is no doubt that many industrial heritage sites in Europe, whether current or potential, can be categorized in this way.

## 3.4 Interim Conclusion (II)

The conclusion from these reflections with regard to transnationalization, dark heritage and European heritage is unambiguous: Existing and potential industrial heritage sites in Europe presenting entangled histories and spatialities can be developed with multiple, overlapping or strongly diverging/contrasting and even mutually exclusive narratives: European specificity as a resource in conflict (Tunbridge/Ashworth 1996). While inevitably there are serious pitfalls in any pattern of commodifying, interpreting (packaging) and transmitting the messages linked to these sites, in part due to the potential multiple uses of appropriate sites, the interpretative approaches should address the motives and strategies of victims, perpetrators and by-standers alike (cf. Ashworth/Hartmann 2005, 253-262, or recently Logan/Reeves 2009, for details). In many cases, it is the specific fusion of innovative feats and internecine atrocities, entangled in a complex, more often than not spatially grounded, pattern of exchange, transfers, intercrossings and mutual interdependence that makes such sites specifically European.

## 4 Conclusions: Europeanizing Industrial Heritage in Europe

Consistent heritage strategies aim at preserving sites and elements that are regarded as representative for certain periods, styles, systems, processes or events. Since heritage, by definition, is the time-specific way of using the past for present purposes, both, the selection of sites and elements as well as their use and interpretation may change over time, more often than not leading to successively shifting strategies of representation. Today an appropriate representation of the industrial world in heritage sites should mirror industrial production systems.

A closer look at industrial systems and regions in continental Europe reveals from their beginning in the early and mid-19th century a host of transboundary functions, linkages, pro-

cesses and structures, many of them created or imposed during wars and/or periods of occupation and annexation. Typical examples of this type are the military-industrial complexes (MIC) that developed during the 19th and 20th centuries in many parts of Europe. Thus in order to appropriately represent the industrial heritage it is necessary both to go beyond the usual national frames of reference and to adopt a deliberately transnational perspective, deliberately including the darker sides of (industrial) history.

These dark sides, however, may “hurt“ (Baker 1988), due to their intrinsic dissonances, i.e. a lack of agreement and consistency as to their meaning(s), leading to a large variety of strategies, or even politics of forgetting, concealing, modifying or erasing. An appropriate way to counter – or uncover – these strategies, and hopefully to address them in a more enlightening way, is to adopt approaches recently developed in the historical sciences: entangled history which combines transnational, multi-lateral, multi-scale and – last, but not least – multi-cultural perspectives.

It is suggested that this way of seeing can be expanded by more consistently developing entangled industrial (heritage) geographies, mirroring and negotiating industrial lieux de mémoire, i.e. industrial sites of remembrance, where their transnational as well as their more painful facets are no longer concealed but turned into site-specific assets reflecting our typical European past.

At the same time, however, this requires more deliberate and reflected strategies of selection, management and interpretation than are currently used in industrial heritage valorisations all over Europe, as the latter are predominantly characterised by a national focus on sanitised representations of the industrial world.

Such a path will not be an easy one. It requires far more open and more tolerant attitudes than are the rule today and at locations where traditional national reflexes tend to be especially strong – or indeed uncomprehending. However, if shared remembrance (preferably characterised by multiple narratives) is possible at sites such

as Verdun or Utah Beach, why should it not be possible at a former French mine in the Ruhr area or a former German armaments factory in what is now the Czech Republic?

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- 1 There are, of course, examples where this is carried out in a most impressive way, cf. Assmann et al. (2002) on the Erfurt producer of Auschwitz furnaces Topf & Söhne, or Riexinger/Ernst (2003) in connection with the Kochendorf salt-mine in southern Germany. The latter became one of many branch sites of the concentration camp Natzweiler-Struthof south-west of Strasbourg with the goal of producing components for the Heinkel HeS 011 jet engine. None of these sites, however, has awoken widespread interest in industrial heritage circles.
- 2 Two explanatory comments on the intended neutrality of the concept as used in this article are necessary here: 1. In both German (*verstrickt sein*) and in English this expression is frequently used in the sense of “fateful”, whereby circumstances are deliberately or unconsciously used to free actors from guilt or responsibility (to a large extent). Such an exculpatory use is not intended at any point in this discussion. 2. Readers familiar with the history of North America will be reminded here of the phrase *entangling alliances* used by President Jefferson in his inaugural speech in 1801, i.e. a warning against entering into political alliances that may become too binding, implying preference for a simultaneous policy of non-intervention. This meaning is also not intended here.